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THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF OKLAHOMA'S
STATUTE DENYING RECOGNITION TO
ADOPTIONS BY SAME-SEX COUPLES
FROM OTHER STATES
Robert G. Spector*
I.

INTRODUCTION

An incredible amount of ink has been spilled on whether a state will
recognize same-sex marriages from other states or foreign countries, while almost
no ink has been spilled on the question of whether adoptions of children by samesex couples will receive recognition. Perhaps the inkwell remains untouched
regarding these issues because up until last year no state attempted to deny
recognition of such adoptions. This changed when Oklahoma amended its
adoption statutes as follows:
The courts of this state shall recognize a decree, judgment, or final order
creating the relationship of parent and child by adoption, issued by a court or other
governmental authority with appropriate jurisdiction in a foreign country or in
another state or territory of the United States. The rights and obligations of the
parties as to matters within the jurisdiction of this state shall be determined as
though the decree, judgment, or final order were issued by a court of this state.
Except that, this state, any of its agencies, or any court of this state shall not recognize
than one individual of the same sex from any other state or
an adoption by more
1
foreign jurisdiction.

While this section has interpretive problems,2 the major question is whether
* Glenn R. Watson Chair and Centennial Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma Law Center.
The author wishes to express his thanks to Nicole Ruble, a second-year student at the Law Center,
whose assistance on this, as well as other projects, has been invaluable.
1. Okla. Stat. tit. 10, § 7502-1.4(A) (Supp. 2005) (emphasis added). The amendment was
apparently adopted in response to an opinion by the Oklahoma Attorney General's office to the effect
that the United States Constitution and Oklahoma law required an Oklahoma agency to recognize
adoption decrees issued to same-sex couples by other states. See Okla. Atty. Gen. Op. 04-8, 1 14, 16
(Mar. 19, 2004).
2. The statute provides that Oklahoma will recognize only one parent of a same-sex adoption from
another state. Its interpretation is probably clear if the adoption is by one partner of the other
partner's biological child, which is the equivalent of a stepparent adoption. In such a case Oklahoma
would probably not recognize the adoption at all and only recognize the biological parent as the legal
parent. However, if a same-sex couple adopts a child that is unrelated to either member of the couple,
the statute is totally silent in terms of which member of the couple would be recognized as the legal
parent. The vast majority of same-sex adoptions appear to be those where one partner adopts the
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Oklahoma can choose to disregard an adoption decree from another state.3 The
author contends that the provision is invalid.4 First, it violates federal law
embodied in the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act ("PKPA"),5 which requires
states to give full faith and credit to custody determinations of other states if made
in accordance with the PKPA's jurisdictional requirements. Second, even if the
PKPA did not exist, the Oklahoma statute would violate the Full Faith and Credit

Clause of the United States Constitution 6 because an adoption decree is a final
judgment and not subject to modification in the state where the judgment is
rendered. Therefore, the judgment must be respected by all other states.7

other partner's biological child. Claire Buxton & Kate Warner, Adoption by Same Sex Couples 6,
http://www.law.utas.edu.au/reform/Publications/adoption/AdoptionEasyPrint.pdf
(Feb. 2003); Natil.
Ctr. for Lesbian Rights, Adoption by Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Parents:An Overview of Current Law
5-8, http://www.nclrights.org/publications/pubs/adptn0204.pdf (Jan. 2004). See generally Maxwell S.
Peltz, Second-ParentAdoption: Overcoming Barriersto Lesbian Family Rights, 3 Mich. J. Gender & L.
175 (1995); Ruthann Robson, Making Mothers: Lesbian Legal Theory & the Judicial Construction of
Lesbian Mothers, 22 Women's Rights L. Rep. 15, 18-19 (2000).
3. The question is phrased in terms of disregarding an adoption granted in another state rather
than a foreign country. The number of European countries that allow same-sex adoptions is far fewer
than those that authorize same-sex marriages or civil unions. Currently, of those countries that allow
same-sex marriages or civil unions, only the Netherlands, Denmark, and Iceland allow same-sex
couples to adopt. Norway, France, Sweden, and Germany prohibit same-sex couples from adopting.
Symposium, Developments in the Law-The Law of Marriage and Family, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1996,
2011 (2003).
Black letter law provides that a state has far more freedom to refuse to recognize a judicial
decision from a foreign country than from another state of the United States. In particular, a state may
refuse to enforce a foreign judgment on public policy grounds. While this ground for refusal of
recognition of foreign judgments is said to apply only in exceptional circumstances, Eugene F. Scoles,
Peter Hay, Patrick J. Borchers, & Symeon C. Symeonides, Conflict of Laws § 24.44 at 1335 (4th ed.,
West 2004), no doubt arises that Oklahoma would find such circumstances in this situation.
4. In addition to the arguments under the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act and the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, which are discussed in this article, there is a potential argument that the Equal
Protection Clause, would also invalidate the Oklahoma adoption statute. In Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620 (1996), the Court struck down class-based legislation directed at homosexuals as a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause. Romer invalidated an amendment to Colorado's constitution which named
as a solitary class persons who were homosexuals, lesbians, or bisexual either by "orientation, conduct,
practices or relationships," and deprived them of protection under state anti-discrimination laws. Id. at
624 (quoting Colo. Const. art. II, § 30b). The Court concluded that the provision was "born of
animosity toward the class of persons affected" and further that it had no rational relation to a
legitimate governmental purpose. Id. at 634-35. Later, in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), the
Court found that Romer presented a "tenable argument" for invalidating Texas same-sex sodomy laws.
Id. at 574-75. While such an argument might also be "tenable" in attacking the Oklahoma statute, its
success is not clear. However, as discussed later in this article, the statute clearly violates the Parental
Kidnaping Prevention Act and the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2000).
6. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.
7. The full faith and credit issue is significantly different with regard to adoptions than it is with
marriages. Marriage may be a public act, but it is not a judgment of a court in the same way that
adoption is. Therefore, the restrictive rules concerning when one state may disregard a judgment of
another state, such as a divorce or dissolution of marriage judgment, are not applicable. States have
long had the ability to choose to apply their own law in their own court system whenever their public
policy requires it. See e.g. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981) (holding that the forum
state can apply its own law rather than the law of another state, provided it has a "significant contact or
significant aggregation of contacts" with the parties and the occurrence or transaction at issue). With
respect to judgments, however, the rules concerning when one state may refuse to respect the
judgment of another state are very restrictive. See Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908). Generally,
a state may refuse to give full faith and credit to a judgment of another state only if that court did not
have jurisdiction to enter the judgment, the judgment was not on the merits, the judgment is
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THE CURRENT SPLIT ON SAME-SEX ADOPTION

Most states have not considered the issue of whether same-sex couples can
adopt, regardless of whether the adoption is by one partner of the other partner's
8
child or by the couple of a non-biologically related child. Two states, California
9
and Vermont, permit same-sex adoptions by statute. Several other states have
interpreted their adoption statutes to allow, or at least not to prohibit, same-sex
couples to adopt, particularly when one partner is adopting the biological child of
the other partner.' Although recognizing that no one has a right to adopt, these
courts recognize that the best interests of the child are served because, in the
words of the Ohio Supreme Court:
Permanent placement in a judicially approved home environment through the
process of adoption is clearly preferable to confining the child in an institution or
relegating the child to a life of transience, from one foster home to another, until
such time as the certified organization determines that it is proper to give its consent
to an adoption."

In contrast, same-sex adoptions are prohibited by statute in at least two
states. 2 Other states have construed their adoption statutes to implicitly deny
same-sex couples the ability to adopt.'3 Courts usually rationalize the result as a
strict construction of their adoption statutes. Those statutes usually do not allow
unrelated parties to adopt without the biological parent relinquishing parental
rights. While adoption statutes do allow for adoption without the relinquishment
those
of parental rights in the case of stepparent adoptions, courts have found
'4
provisions not applicable to same-sex couples since they cannot marry.
This dichotomy between jurisdictions will undoubtedly continue. Given the
mobility of our population, inevitably same-sex couples will move from states
which allow them to adopt to states where such adoptions are prohibited, thus
raising the question as to whether the adoptions will receive recognition. The
issue is most likely to arise in the context of a proceeding where custody of the
modifiable, or the judgment was procured by extrinsic fraud. See generally Scoles et al., supra n. 3, at
ch. 22.
8. The question of whether same-sex adoptions ought to be allowed is beyond the scope of this
article. That entire topic, especially in light of Lawrence v. Texas, is surveyed in Martin R. Gardner,
Adoption by Homosexuals in the Wake of Lawrence v. Texas, 6 J.L. & Fam. Stud. 19 (2004).
9. Cal. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 9000(b), 297(a)-(b) (West 2004); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15A,§ 1-102 (2002).
App. 1st Dist. 1995); In re Adoption of K.S.P., 804
10. See e.g. In re Pet. of K.M., 653 N.E.2d 888 (I11.
N.E.2d 1253 (Ind. App. 2004); Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993); In re Adoption of
Two Children, 666 A.2d 535 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1995); In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995).
11. In re Adoption of Charles B., 552 N.E.2d 884, 889 (Ohio 1990) (quoting State v. Summers, 311
N.E.2d 6, 13 (Ohio 1974)) (authorizing the adoption of an eight-year-old boy by his counselor even
though the counselor was homosexual).
12. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 63.042(3) (West Supp. 2005); Miss. Code Ann. § 93-17-3 (2004). The Utah
statute prohibits adoption by persons living together in a sexual relationship outside of marriage. Utah
Code Ann. § 78-30-1(3)(b) (2002). The constitutionality of the Florida statute was upheld in Lofton v.
Sec. of Dept. of Children and Fain. Servs., 377 F.3d 1275 (1lth Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869
(2005).
13. See e.g. In re Adoption of T.K.J., 931 P.2d 488 (Colo. App. 1996); In re Adoption of Luke, 640
N.W.2d 374 (Neb. 2002); In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 1994).
14. See supra n. 13.
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adopted child is at issue. If the adoption were recognized, the court would decide

the case as it would decide a custody case between two parents. 15 However, if the
adoption were not recognized, the court would decide the case as if it were a case

between the biological parent and a third-party. In many states this situation
would result in the
application of a very different standard, one favoring the
16
biological parent.
Clearly, a state that does not authorize same-sex adoptions cannot lawfully
refuse to recognize a same-sex adoption from another state. To do so violates
both the PKPA and the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution.
III.

17

THE PARENTAL KIDNAPING PREVENTION ACT

The PKPA was enacted in 1980 to provide full faith and credit to child

custody adjudications made in conformity with the PKPA's jurisdictional
standards. The PKPA is best understood against the background of interstate
child custody adjudications and the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
("UCCJA"). s The UCCJA was designed to bring some order out of the chaos
that constituted interstate custody litigation at the time.' 9 Prior to the enactment

of the UCCJA, a disappointed litigant in a custody case could remove the child
from the original decree-granting state to another state and begin litigation all

over again. Since the original custody determination could be modified in the
state that rendered it, it could be modified in another state. Such modifications
had the very unfortunate tendency "to reduce the law of [interstate] custody to a
rule of seize-and-run." 20

Section 3 of the UCCJA provided that jurisdiction to make a child custody
determination would lie in either the child's home state, the state where the child
had significant contacts, the state where an emergency arose, or, if no other state

had jurisdiction under the Act, the current forum. Other sections of the UCCJA
resolved concurrent jurisdiction problems by giving priority to the first to file. The

15. In Oklahoma, as in most states, the standard would be the best interests of the child. Okla. Stat.
tit. 43, § 109(A) (2001).
16. Oklahoma authorizes courts to grant custody to third parties only in limited circumstances,
usually requiring a finding that the parent is unfit. See In re Grover, 681 P.2d 81, 83 (Okla. 1984).
Oklahoma statutes identify other circumstances where custody might be granted to third parties. Okla.
Stat. tit. 10, § 21.1 (Supp. 2004); Okla. Stat. tit. 43, § 112.2 (Supp. 2005). See generally Robert G.
Spector, Family Law: Third Party Custody After Baby Girl L. and A.G.S.: Now Where Are We? 56
Okla. L. Rev. 415 (2003). Whether a domestic partner can be considered in loco parentis for purposes
of the application of the best interest standard is beyond the scope of this article. However, for an
example of a case concerning this issue, see In re A.B., 818 N.E.2d 126 (Ind. App. 2004).
17. 28 U.S.C. §1738A.
18. 9(IA) U.L.A. 270 (1999).
19. The background of the UCCJA is discussed in the Prefatory Note to the Act, 9(IA) U.L.A. 26264 (1999). The Reporter for the UCCJA, Professor Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, wrote a series of very
influential articles providing the background as well as indicating how the UCCJA should be
implemented. See Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: A
Legislative Remedy for Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 1207 (1969); Brigitte
M. Bodenheimer, Progress Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and Remaining
Problems: Punitive Decrees, Joint Custody, and Excessive Modifications, 65 Cal. L. Rev. 978 (1977).
20. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 542 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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UCCJA also provided that a child custody determination made in accordance with
the jurisdictional standards of the Act would be enforced in other states.
The UCCJA was adopted as law in all 50 states, the District of Columbia,

and the Virgin Islands. A number of states, however, significantly departed from
the original text.2' In addition, the years of litigation after the promulgation of the
UCCJA produced substantial inconsistency in interpretation by state courts.2223 As
a result, the goals of the UCCJA were rendered unobtainable in many cases.
In 1980, the federal government enacted the PKPA to address the interstate

custody recognition problems that continued to exist after the adoption of the
UCCJA. The PKPA mandates that state authorities give full faith and credit to
other states' custody determinations, so long as those determinations were made

in conformity with the provisions of the PKPA. The PKPA provisions regarding
bases for jurisdiction, restrictions on modifications, preclusion of simultaneous
proceedings, and notice requirements are similar to those in the UCCJA.
However, some significant differences exist between the PKPA and the UCCJA.

For example, the PKPA authorizes continuing exclusive jurisdiction in the original
decree state so long as one parent or the child remains there and that state has
24

continuing jurisdiction under its own law. Unlike the PKPA, the UCCJA did not
directly address this issue. To further complicate the process, the PKPA partially

21. For example, Alaska omitted the "significant connection" jurisdiction basis of UCCJA §3(a)(2).
Alaska Stat. § 25.30.020 (repealed 1998). Texas prioritized home state jurisdiction over the other
jurisdictional bases. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §152.003 (repealed 1999). Arizona equated "domicile" with
"home state." Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-433 (repealed 2000).
22. For examples on the issue of whether an order entered pursuant to emergency jurisdiction must
be a temporary order or whether it can be a permanent order, compare Curtis v. Curtis, 574 So. 2d 24
(Miss. 1990) (temporary), with Cullen v. Prescott, 394 S.E.2d 722 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990) (can be
permanent if no other custody case is pending).
23. One of the main reasons why the goals of the UCCJA were not accomplished is because the
goals were incompatible. The UCCJA embodied two main goals: first to prevent parental kidnaping of
children by attempting to provide clear rules of jurisdiction and enforcement, and second to provide
that the forum which decided the custody determination would be the forum that could make the most
informed decision. These goals proved to be mutually incompatible. As a result, courts rendered
decisions that were doctrinally inconsistent as they provided for the primacy of one goal or another
depending on the result they wished to accomplish in an individual case. Ann B. Goldstein, The
Tragedy of the Interstate Child: A CriticalReexamination of the Uniform Child Custody JurisdictionAct
and the ParentalKidnaping Prevention Act, 25 U. Cal. Davis L. Rev. 845 (1992) (exhaustively and
authoritatively documenting how the inconsistency of the UCCJA goals produced inconsistent court
decisions).
The inconsistency of the UCCJA reflects the dichotomy in substantive custody law between
certainty of result and individual decisionmaking in the "best interest" of the child. Since many of the
participants in the Drafting Committee for the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement
Act (the replacement for the UCCJA) were family law practitioners, this dichotomy loomed large
throughout the Committee's discussions. Ultimately the Drafting Committee concluded that no
coherent act could be drafted which effectively maintained the primacy of both goals. Therefore, the
drafters of the UCCJEA determined that it was more important to identify which state has jurisdiction
to make a determination than to find the "best" state court to make the determination. See Uniform
Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (with Prefatory Note and Comments by Robert G.
Spector), 32 Fam. L.Q.303, 305-06 (1998) [hereinafter UCCJEA] (the author was the Reporter for the
UCCJEA).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d).
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incorporates state UCCJA law in its languageS The relationship between these
26
two statutes became "technical enough to delight a medieval property lawyer.,
In response to the difficulties of reading the UCCJA and the PKPA
together, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
revised the UCCJA to conform to the PKPA. The result is known as the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA").27
The critical question with regard to the recognition of an adoption decree is
whether such a decree is a "child custody determination" within the meaning of
these acts. The answer is clear with regard to the UCCJEA. Section 102 provides
that "this Act does not govern an adoption proceeding." The reason why the
UCCJEA does not govern adoption proceedings is that the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws had recently promulgated the Uniform
Adoption Act ("UAA"),28 which contained jurisdictional provisions at variance
with those set forth in the UCCJEA. The Conference could hardly put forth two
acts on the same subject with different rules, although most members of the
Drafting Committee would have preferred to regulate adoption jurisdiction via
the UCCJEA rather than the UAA.29
However, the answer was quite different under the UCCJA and, most
importantly, under the PKPA. For example, in In re E.H.H.,3 the father and
mother of E.H.H. divorced in California. 31 The mother was granted sole legal and
physical custody of E.H.H., while the father was granted conditional visitation
rights. The wife remarried and she and her husband filed in a Utah juvenile court
for termination of the father's parental rights and adoption of E.H.H. by the
mother's new husband. The father moved for dismissal of the petition, claiming it
involved determination of custody and visitation, which were outside the
jurisdiction of the Utah court system under the terms of the PKPA. The trial
court denied the father's motion to dismiss and held that the termination of
32
parental rights was not a custody or visitation determination.
The appellate court reversed, finding that termination of parental, rights via
an adoption is "the ultimate custody and visitation determination as to the party
whose rights are terminated., 33 The court then concluded that, under the PKPA,

25. The incorporation occurs because the PKPA provides that a custody determination "is
consistent with the provisions of this section only if-(1) such court has jurisdiction under the law of
such State." 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(1). The law of the state means that state's version of the UCCJA or
the UCCJEA.
26. Homer H. Clark, Jr., The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States § 12.5 (2d ed., West
1988).
27. 9(IA) U.L.A. 655 (1999).
28. 9(IA) U.L.A. 11 (1999).
29. See UCCJEA, supra n. 23, at 321 n. 39.
30. 16 P.3d 1257 (Utah App. 2000).
31. Id. at 1258.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1259.
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the subsequent adoption and the termination of parental rights did affect prior
34
custody and visitation determinations. Thus, the Utah court lacked jurisdiction.
Another case to the same effect is In re Adoption of Asente.35 This case
concerned whether • Kentucky
or Ohio had jurisdiction to consider contested
36
3
adoption proceedings. The child, Justin, was born in Kentucky.37 The Asentes
adopted their first child from Justin's mother and decided to adopt Justin as their
second child. After giving birth to Justin, the mother changed her mind. Eleven
months later, the mother contacted the Asentes and discussed her renewed
willingness to put Justin up for adoption. The termination proceeding was to take
place in Kentucky and during the time prior to the proceeding the mother stated
her understanding that she could change her mind at any time prior to the
381
culmination of the termination proceeding.
The mother and father of the child signed separate documents entitled
"voluntary and informed consent to adoption. '' 39 The form stated that "consent
was final and irrevocable twenty days after execution of the document." 40 Shortly
thereafter, the Asentes signed a legal risk document acknowledging that the
natural parents could revoke their consent anytime prior to the hearing on the
termination of parental rights. 4 ' The Kentucky and Ohio Offices of Interstate
Compact on the Placement of Children "approved the placement of the child with
the Asentes. '42 Justin was transported to Ohio, where he continued to reside.
On the day of the final hearing for the termination of parental rights in
Kentucky, the natural parents informed their attorney that they no longer wished
to go forward with the adoption and wanted the child to be returned to them. The
child had been in Ohio for 37 days at this point in time. The hearing in the
Kentucky court for termination was then cancelled pending further action.4
The Asentes then filed a petition for adoption of Justin in Ohio. The
Kentucky court issued an order asserting that it had jurisdiction over any issues
relating to the custody and best interests of Justin.45 Ultimately both the Ohio
court and the Kentucky court determined they had jurisdiction.

34. Interestingly, the E.H.H. court refuted the mother's contention that the earlier case of In re
R.N.J., 908 P.2d 345 (Utah App. 1995) (finding that, for purposes of the UCCJA, termination of
parental rights is not a custody determination) applied to the present case. E.H.H., 16 P.3d at 1260.
The court distinguished R.N.J., by noting that the UCCJA and the PKPA are two separate statutes and
that the PKPA preempted the UCCJA. Id.
35. 734 N.E.2d 1224 (Ohio 2000).
36. Id. at 1225.
37. Id. at 1226.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. 734 N.E.2d at 1226.
41. Id. at 1227.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. 734 N.E.2d at 1227.
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The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the trial court and determined that the46

trial court should have given full faith and credit to the Kentucky determination.

The court recognized that "adoption proceedings are truly custody proceedings
requiring application of the PKPA and the UCCJA because the end result of an
adoption is the complete termination of the rights of the birth parents., 47 The
court then found fault with the Ohio trial court's previous decisions not to give full
faith and credit to the Kentucky declarations because the petition for termination
of voluntary rights was not considered a custody proceeding.4 The court also
determined that although the child had significant contacts with Ohio, Kentucky
was the appropriate forum to assert jurisdiction over the matter, and the Ohio
court should have given full faith and credit to the Kentucky ruling that the
consent forms were not valid 9
No cases exist holding that an adoption is not a custody determination within
the meaning of the PKPA. Thus, if an adoption decree were rendered in a
proceeding that complied with the PKPA's jurisdictional requirements (i.e., the
court which rendered the decree was within the child's home state, or, if no home
state existed, then a state with significant connections to the child and with

substantial evidence concerning the child), then all other states must recognize the
decree. The Oklahoma statute, which would refuse to recognize such adoptions,

therefore violates the Act and is unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause.
IV.

THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE

Persuasive arguments have been made that the PKPA does not fit adoption
cases very well and ought not be used to determine interstate jurisdiction and

recognition.50 Adoptions do not fit very well into the jurisdictional scheme of
UCCJA, upon which the PKPA was based. A state rarely qualifies as the home

state. In most cases, the child is born in one state, the relinquishment takes place
in that state, and the prospective adoptive parents take the child to another state

46. Id. at 1231.
47. Id. at 1231-32.
48. Id. at 1232.
49. Id. at 1234. Other cases to the same effect are Adoption of ZachariahK., 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 423
(Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1992); People ex rel A.J.C., 88 P.3d 599 (Colo. 2004), cert. denied sub nom. C.M.C.
v. G.A.L., 125 S. Ct. 495 (2004); In re Custody of K.R., 897 P.2d 896 (Colo. App. 1995); In re B.B.R.,
566 A.2d 1032 (D.C. 1989); In re Adoption of Child by T.W.C. and P.C., 636 A.2d 1083 (N.J. Super
App. Div. 1994); In re Aja Juan Hayes, 979 P.2d 779 (Or. App. 1999).
50. See Bernadette W. Hartfield, The Uniform Child Custody JurisdictionAct and the Problem of
Jurisdiction in Interstate Adoption: An Easy Fix? 43 Okla. L. Rev. 621 (1990); Herma Hill Kay,
Adoption in the Conflict of Laws: The UAA, Not the UCCJA, Is the Answer, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 703 (1996).
Regardless of whether one agrees with Professors Kay and Hatfield concerning adoption decrees
generally, it is clear that some aspects of the post-adoption process are custody proceedings. For
example, if a state follows the UAA and provides that if an adoption is denied or set aside, the court is
to determine the child's custody and the prospective adoptive parents would have standing to seek
custody. 9(IA) U.L.A. 11, § 3-704. Such a proceeding is a custody proceeding and subject to the
provisions of the UCCJEA and the PKPA. See Joan Heifetz Hollinger, The Uniform Adoption Act:
Reporter's Ruminations, 30 Fam. L.Q. 345 (1996). This point is not always perceived by courts. See e.g.
A.J.C., 88 P.3d 599 (finding that the PKPA, but not the UCCJEA, is applicable to custody disputes
following a failed adoption, but not recognizing a Missouri decree setting aside the adoption for
reasons related to the UCCJA, which is still the law in Missouri).
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to begin adoption proceedings. The first state cannot be the home state because
the child has not lived there since birth. The second state cannot be the home
state because the child has not lived there for six months. Thus, jurisdiction and
recognition would have to be based on significant connection jurisdiction. In
practice, this scenario leads to a race to the courthouse and conflicting assertions
of jurisdiction that take months, maybe even years, to resolve.'
A second, and more persuasive argument, is that the PKPA was not
necessary to provide full faith and credit protection to adoption decrees, or
decrees setting aside adoptions, as it was with custody decisions. Custody
decisions were modifiable in a second state since they could be modified in the
state that originally determined custody. On the other hand, adoption decrees and
orders setting aside adoptions are final judgments and are no more modifiable
than a contract, tort, or other judgment of a court. As such, a decree of adoption
is entitled to the same full faith and credit protection as those judgments.
Therefore, even without the enactment of the PKPA, an adoption decree could
only be denied recognition when the original court lacked jurisdiction, or when
the decree was obtained by extrinsic fraud.52
That adoption decrees were entitled to full faith and credit prior to the
enactment of the PKPA seemed to be relatively uncontroversial.53 For example,
in Ex Parte Osborne,54 the petitioner adopted a child in 1922 under the laws of
Virginia.55 She contended that the biological mother consented to the adoption.
In 1933, the biological mother asked to take the child to West Virginia for a twoweek visit. The adoptive mother consented to the trip, but the biological mother
never brought the child back to Virginia. Instead, the biological mother moved to
North Carolina with the child. When the adoptive mother petitioned for the
child's return, the North Carolina trial court determined that it 56was in the best
mother.
interest of the child to remain in the care of her biological
The North Carolina Supreme Court found that the child was legally adopted
in Virginia and that the adoption decree from Virginia must be given full faith and
51. The classic case involving a failed interstate adoption is, of course, the Baby Jessica case, which
ultimately found its way to the highest court of two states and took almost four years to resolve. See In
re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1992); In re Clausen, 501 N.W.2d 193 (Mich. App. 1993), affd, 502
N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993), stay denied sub. nom. DeBoer v. DeBoer, 509 U.S. 1301 (1993) (referring to
the Iowa decree setting aside the adoption as a "custody" order), and stay denied sub nom. DeBoer v.

DeBoer,509 U.S. 938 (1993).
52. The "lack of finality" and "not on the merits" defenses to the full faith and credit requirement
are obviously not applicable to an adoption decree.
53. See Scoles et al., supra n. 3, at 703. This applies to the adoption itself. The incidental effects of
the adoption can be treated differently. A second state can apply its own law to determine the rights of
adopted children and does not have to accord adopted children the same rights they would enjoy under
the law of the state that decreed the adoption. See Hood v. McGehee, 237 U.S. 611 (1915); Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws § 290 (1971). Oklahoma law provides that an adoption from another
state provides the same rights as if the adoption had taken place in Oklahoma. Okla. Stat. tit. 10, §
7502-1.4(A). However, the Oklahoma statute that refuses to recognize adoptions by same-sex couples
from other states purports to modify the adoption itself and is not simply concerned with the incidental
effects of the adoption.
54. 172 S.E. 491 (N.C. 1934).
55. Id.
56. Id.
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credit in North Carolina.57 The biological mother contended that the Virginia
court did not have jurisdiction to issue a decree of adoption because she did not
consent to the adoption. The court refused this argument and found that the
biological mother failed to show fraud or that the Virginia court did not have
58
jurisdiction to issue the decree.
Another example is Stewart v. Stewart.59 In West Virginia, the natural father
contested the adoption of his child in Virginia by the natural mother's second
husband. 60 This issue came before the trial court because the natural mother
moved back to the county where her divorce was originally obtained and the
father petitioned the trial court for expanded visitation rights. The natural mother
defended the action by producing the Virginia adoption decree and moving for
summary judgment under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.
The trial court denied the natural mother's request for summary judgment
and refused to give full faith and credit to the Virginia decree because the court
found it was not required to afford full faith and credit to a decree predicated on
an unconstitutional statute. The trial court found that the Virginia adoption
statute was unconstitutionally vague because it authorized an adoption if the
adoption was in the best interests of the child. 6' The West Virginia Supreme
Court reversed. 62 It determined that the assertion in one state that another state's
statute is unconstitutional is not permissible in a full faith and credit context.
Since neither party alleged that the Virginia court lacked jurisdiction or that the
decree was obtained by extrinsic fraud, West Virginia was required to give full
faith and credit to the Virginia decree.63

Because states must give full faith and credit to an adoption decree from a
state that authorizes same-sex adoptions, states that do not allow such adoptions
would still have to recognize adoption decrees from other states. In Russell v.
Bridgens,64 one member of a same-sex couple adopted a child in Pennsylvania."
Later, the other member also adopted the child in what the decree referred to as a
"co-parent" adoption. Upon moving to Nebraska, the second adopting parent
filed a petition seeking custody of, and support for, the child. The first adopting
parent responded and filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that the "coparent" adoption was invalid under Pennsylvania law, and therefore the petitioner

57. Id. at 493.
58. Id.
59. 289 S.E.2d 652 (W. Va. 1980).
60. Id. at 653.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 656.
63. Id. For other cases to the same effect, see e.g. Hubbard v. Super. Court of Cal., 11 Cal. Rptr.
700 (Cal. Dist. App. 3d Dist. 1961); Petition of J.E.G. and M.K.G, 357 A.2d 855 (D.C. 1976); In re
Benfield, 468 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
64. 647 N.W.2d 56 (Neb. 2002).
65. Id. at 58.
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was not a legal parent of the child. 6 The trial court found for the respondent and
67
petitioner appealed.
The Nebraska Supreme Court found that the dispositive question was
whether the Pennsylvania court had subject matter jurisdiction. 6 It agreed with
the petitioner that if the Pennsylvania court did have subject matter jurisdiction,
then it was required under the full faith and credit clause to recognize the
adoption. 69 The respondent argued that the requirements of the Pennsylvania
adoption statutes were not met. The Nebraska Supreme Court remanded the case
to the trial court to take evidence to determine whether the violations of the
Pennsylvania adoption law, if any, related to the court's subject matter jurisdiction
or whether they were simply errors of law. If the latter then the adoption would
be entitled to full faith and credit.7 °
V.

CONCLUSION

The conclusion is inescapable. Whether one analyzes the issue as
recognition under the PKPA or under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the
answer is the same. Oklahoma has no choice but to recognize adoptions by samesex couples that are granted in states where such adoptions are valid. Indeed this
conclusion was recognized by the Oklahoma Attorney General's office when it
issued its opinion indicating that Oklahoma would have to recognize adoptions
validly decreed by other states, regardless of whether the parents were of the same
or opposite sexes. 7
Therefore, Oklahoma's statute refusing to do so is
unconstitutional. 2

66. Id.
67. Id. at 58-59.
68. Id. at 59.
69. 647 N.W.2d at 60.
70. Id.
71. Okla. Atty. Gen. Op. 04-8, supra n. 1.
72. The statute is currently the subject of a proceeding in the Western District of Oklahoma to
enjoin its enforcement. Finstuen v. Edmondson, No. CIV-04-1152-C (filed Sept. 15, 2004). The State's
motion to dismiss on the ground that the suit violated the Eleventh Amendment was denied on
December 7, 2004.
Order, Finstuen, No. CIV-04-1152-C (filed Dec. 7, 2004), available at
http://www.lambdalegal.orgbinary-data/LAMBDA-PDF/pdf/350.pdf (accessed Mar. 6, 2005). The
State has taken an appeal to the Tenth Circuit. Finstuen v. Henry, No. 04-6395 (filed Dec. 17, 2004).
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